Undocumented Migrant Workers in a Fragmented International Order by Thomas, Chantal
Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 25 | Issue 1 Article 10
Undocumented Migrant Workers in a Fragmented
International Order
Chantal Thomas
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland
Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chantal Thomas, Undocumented Migrant Workers in a Fragmented International Order, 25 Md. J. Int'l L. 187 (2010).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol25/iss1/10
THOMAS MACRO - 5-14-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2010 2:56 PM 
 
 
 
187 
 
Undocumented Migrant Workers in a 
Fragmented International Order 
 
CHANTAL THOMAS
†  
_______________________ 
 
 
This Paper tries to show the effects of a central challenge of 
contemporary global governance: the ―interaction between normative 
orders that are fundamentally different in their underlying conceptual 
structure.‖1 The argument is that the dynamics of globalization create 
and accentuate particular social phenomena as well as efforts towards 
coordinated regulation of these phenomena, but that the latter are far 
from sufficient to meet the former. A further assertion is that global 
relations and distributions of power determine the operation of this 
fragmented framework. Social vulnerability is reflected in and 
reinforced by it. As such, the undocumented migrant worker 
challenges, in many senses of the term, the margins of global 
governance and international law: the boundaries reflected in 
sovereign territoriality which continue to undergird international law, 
and to represent the limits of its permissible jurisdiction, and yet 
which are challenged by the aspiration towards globalization 
embodied physically in the person of the undocumented migrant 
worker. 
 
 † Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Sincere thanks to the editors of the 
Maryland Journal of International Law for their assistance. I am grateful to the 
University of Maryland School of Law, and especially Professors Michael Van 
Alstine and Peter Danchin, for assembling such a fantastic conversation. Earlier 
versions of this Paper were presented to meetings of the Law and Society 
Association and the Labor Law and Development Research Network; my thanks to 
the participants in those discussions for their valuable comments. Errors are of 
course mine alone.  
1.  Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 869, 873 (1988). 
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In this sense, the undocumented migrant both fulfills and 
transgresses the global order. This Paper represents a series of 
meditations on this theme. Parts I and II indicate the broader reaches 
of this analysis, discussing ―illegal markets‖ in the global order more 
generally and clarifying theoretical and methodological 
commitments. Parts III and IV examine in more detail the figure of 
the undocumented migrant worker at both the international and 
national plane. Parts V and VI ―cash out‖ both the material and 
discursive effects of the current approaches to irregular migration. 
I. THE ILLEGAL MARKETS PROJECT 
This Paper was originally inspired by a project on illegal global 
markets, primarily organized crime, drugs, prostitution, trafficking, 
and migrant smuggling.2 Although these are very different types of 
transactions, my general argument is the same: first, these illegal 
markets are an inherent part of globalization; second, the emerging 
posture of prohibitionism may not reduce the incidence of illegal 
markets and may actually exacerbate their harmful characteristics. 
Call these illicit markets the dark side of globalization.3 On 
globalization‘s ―bright side,‖4 trade facilitated by multilaterally 
coordinated market rules yields aggregate welfare gains.5 On this 
dark side, in law‘s shadow, massive disparities between (poor) 
 
2. See, e.g., Chantal Thomas, International Law Against Sex Trafficking in 
Perspective (Oct. 2004)  (unpublished paper presented at the Wisconsin-Harvard 
Workshop on International Economic Law and Transnational Regulation) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Thomas, International Law Against Sex Trafficking]; 
Chantal Thomas et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal 
Responses: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 336 (2006) [hereinafter Thomas et al., From the International to the Local 
in Feminist Legal Responses]; Chantal Thomas, Globalization and the Border, 41 
MCGEORGE L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (14th Annual Distinguished Speakers 
Series) [hereinafter Thomas, Globalization at the Border]. 
3. See Moisés Naím, The Fourth Annual Grotius Lecture: Five Wars of 
Globalization, 18 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 1, 13 (2002). For a treatment of the ―dark 
side‖ of international humanitarian and human rights law, see DAVID KENNEDY, 
THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM 
(2004). 
4. See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side Of Private Ordering: 
An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 
43 (2000). The usage here reflects that of Milhaupt to discuss domestic illicit trade. 
Id. 
5. For a discussion of the distributive consequences of trade liberalization, see 
generally Joel R. Paul, Do International Trade Institutions Contribute to Economic 
Growth and Development?, 44 VA. J. INT‘L L. 285 (2003). 
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―sending‖ and (rich) ―receiving‖ countries combine with 
sophisticated technologies of production and distribution to produce 
volatile dynamics of supply and demand.   
Given the global nature of the problem, it is unsurprising that 
international law has arisen to stanch the flow through interstate 
coordination.6 Such coordination has produced a paradoxical 
historical moment, which Peter Andreas has dubbed ―open markets, 
closed borders.‖7 That is, at the same time that states have 
coordinated to create ―borderless economies‖ in legal goods and 
services, they are coordinating to police their borders against illegal 
goods and services. Thus, the illegal markets project looks primarily 
at the legal rules that seek to prohibit these markets and analyzes the 
causes and effects of prohibitionism.  I discuss these aspects further 
below in Part I.B. (setting out a theory of illegal markets), and Part 
III.B. (discussing the prohibitionist regime in contemporary 
international criminal law). 
A. Illegal Markets and Legal Pluralism 
This Part will explore the relationship between my illegal markets 
project and the insights of legal pluralism, focusing in particular on 
the market for illegal market labor—in other words, for 
undocumented migrant workers. 
There are overlapping regimes that address illegal migration. 
Despite international law‘s pronounced allegiance to free trade and 
human rights, neither set of principles addresses illegal migration 
very much, although some instruments do exist. Illegal migrants are a 
product of globalization driving through and between existing and 
emerging legal regimes at the national and international levels.   
From a welfare perspective, the general effect of the current 
arrangement of legal regimes—which overlap in some areas but leave 
gaps in others—is that poor and vulnerable individuals from both 
sending and receiving countries suffer.8 Illegal migrants themselves 
 
6. See generally PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN NADELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE: 
CRIMINALIZATION AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2006). 
7. Peter Andreas, U.S.–Mexico: Open Markets, Closed Borders, 103 FOREIGN 
POL‘Y 51, 51 (1996). 
8. The deviations of fragmentation ―should not be understood as legal-technical 
‗mistakes.‘ They reflect the differing pursuits and preferences [that] actors in a 
pluralistic (global) society have . . . [i]n conditions of social complexity . . . .‖ 
International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group, Fragmentation of 
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are subject to a great deal of abuse.  And similarly situated native 
workers see their bargaining power reduced. 
B. A Theory on Criminal Markets in Liberal States  
International economic law tends to employ traditional trade 
theory to assist its analysis of the legal rules affecting the cross-
border flows of goods and people and the underlying economic 
characteristics of those flows. Yet without also analyzing illegal 
markets, international economic law scholars cannot hope to obtain 
an accurate picture of the economy.   
At the center of this dynamic is the power of international markets 
to erode the nation-state, creating deep tensions between different 
conceptual fundaments of Western modernity: the nation-state and 
the market.  
We can see this with the ongoing civil and political resistance to 
imported trade in goods in virtually all societies, regardless of how 
well established international trade agreements may be. In the United 
States, the increase in trade in goods and the concomitant decrease in 
manufacturing has produced a variety of discourses around the need 
for maintaining the national economy as a basis for national security 
and, more generally, the American way of life. ―Made in the USA‖ 
campaigns tap into national identity to mobilize against imported 
goods. Free trade advocates are at a loss to provide an alternative 
identity that is as powerful as that of the nation, with the consequence 
that protectionism often takes the form of nationalism. If the 
importation of goods presents the nation with a quandary, though, the 
importation of people threatens national identity even more.   
The nationalist resistance to the importation of goods and labor 
presents the modern nation-state with a deep quandary because the 
modern Western nation-state is self-consciously liberal. Liberalism 
means (1) an embrace of trade and the market; (2) a tolerance for and 
 
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, para. 16 (April 13, 2006) [hereinafter 
Fragmentation], available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G06/ 
610/77/PDF/G0661077.pdf?OpenElement. From a functional perspective, one 
could argue that illegal migrant workforces are allowed in, as their legalization is 
not politically plausible, so that they get entry and employers (large and small) get 
access to their labor, and their families and communities get their remittances. 
Thus, there is certainly a logic to the state of affairs, despite its seeming disarray. I 
discuss this a bit more in the Conclusion. 
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openness to diverse identities (as long as they do not threaten this 
basic tolerance—so tolerance is far from neutrality); and (3) a 
conception of the individual as fundamentally a right-holder, with all 
individuals being equal insofar as they hold rights. 
The dilemma means that there will be tensions and forces driving a 
restrictive regulatory impulse. The restrictive regulatory impulse is 
intended to preserve both the material and ideal status quo. Yet the 
regulatory impulse at the same time contradicts an important facet of 
that status quo, which is liberalism. 
Out of this tension, a mediating dynamic arises, which reconciles 
the restrictive impulse with the liberal market-state. The mediating 
function arises out of the production and applications of justifications 
for regulation in the face of the liberal project. These justifications 
are where the public resides: the domain in which ―intervention‖ into 
the ―private‖ exchanges of the market (or the family) are justified.  
Within liberalism, the default rule is that the state should not 
intervene. Where the state does ―intervene,‖ there must be a 
justification. Here intervention is understood not as the difference 
between regulation and the absence of regulation but rather as the 
difference between the idealized mode of regulation and some other 
mode.   
That is, maintaining the market requires concerted effort on the 
part of the state, but that effort is idealized and to a large extent 
rendered invisible—the market is seen as the natural and normal 
situation. Restricting the market is a highly visible form of regulation 
because it departs from this idealized form. Restricting the market 
thus requires a raft of justifications (while maintaining a liberalized 
market does not, as it is presumed to be the natural state of affairs). 
The level of scrutiny applied to the justification varies between 
―negative‖ and ―positive‖ liberalism. Negative liberalism, a la Locke, 
would require a stronger justification than would positive liberalism a 
la Rousseau, where the state is acknowledged to play a much more 
proactive role in aiding the citizens in their constitution as such. 
The stronger justification, however, requires a stronger response. 
Hence, a strong form of negative liberalism may, paradoxically, tend 
to produce stronger regulatory responses—because the bar for 
regulatory intervention is higher. Once it is reached, the case has 
been made for a much stronger threat to the public good, and thus a 
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stronger response is required. 
Thus, a regime that is self-consciously liberal may tend to be 
accompanied by regulatory responses of a prohibitionist or 
abolitionist quality. That is the basic dynamic. But what then shapes 
the nature of the justifications for regulation—in this case, 
prohibition through criminalization? There are two varieties of 
justification. One is the legitimate-ideological. The other is the 
illegitimate-ideological. 
The legitimate-ideological refers to the justifications that are at 
home within and accepted by liberalism. Essentially, the legitimate-
ideological justification within classical liberalism is the ―harm‖ 
principle: individual activities are permitted so long as they do not 
cause ―harm‖ to others (J. S. Mill). Where activities are viewed as 
dangerous to others, they are not permitted. So public health is a 
thoroughly acceptable basis for regulatory intervention from the 
classical liberal perspective. 
But of course this category only provides general justification. In 
fact social activity produces many complex effects and negative 
externalities. By itself it is too broad to specify what kinds of 
negative externalities will be permitted absolutely, which will be 
conditionally permitted, and which will be banned. For example, 
within classical liberal contract law, opportunistic behavior is 
permitted so long as it does not take the form of behaviors placed 
within the unacceptable categories of fraud or duress. Within 
classical liberal property law, questionable individual uses of 
property are permitted so long as they do not take the form of 
unacceptable behaviors placed in the category of nuisance.   
More generally, certain kinds of marketized activity, such as sales 
of products or services, are permitted and others are not. Automobiles 
are permitted even though automobile deaths are inevitable and 
substantial. The response to the harm takes the form of regulation that 
conditions the production and use of automobiles to try to reduce the 
harms—regulations to reduce the likelihood of dangerous defects in 
the product and to increase the likelihood of safe usage of them 
(licenses and speed limits). Similarly, the production and provision to 
others of fattening food is permitted, although disease and death from 
it is substantial. The response to the harm takes the form of regulation 
requiring disclosure of nutritional value. 
THOMAS MACRO - 5-14-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2010  2:56 PM 
2010] FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL ORDER 193 
The intensity and likelihood of the harm to others is one central 
measure of assessment for regulating the market. As per classical 
liberal utilitarianism, this harm is weighed against the potential 
benefit of the activity. 
Protecting individuals from harming themselves is a second mode 
of justification for regulation. This kind of justification enjoys 
ideological legitimacy of a more qualified sort. This kind of 
regulatory intervention does not find its justification in classical 
―negative‖ liberalism but rather in more paternalistic approaches that 
both antedated and succeeded classical liberalism. The extent to 
which such paternalistic measures are tolerated in part stems from the 
societal acceptance of alternative forms of liberalism: classical 
―positive‖ liberalism and postclassical Fordism. 
These justifications are ideologically legitimate because they can 
be expressed explicitly as the basis for regulatory intervention. 
However, there are other justifications, which I call illegitimate-
ideological, which are not expressed. These justifications are 
―illiberal‖ because they turn away from the liberal idea of an 
abstracted, universal self and an abstracted relationship between that 
self and the state. Instead, they arise from particularistic social 
identities. Preserving the geographical, cultural, racial, religious, 
linguistic, and gender identity of the idealized nation-state fuels these 
justifications. In other words, a threat to the idealized national 
identity is a form of harm, and regulatory interventions in the market 
may be motivated by the desire to control that harm. 
Thus, where a product or service in the market is associated with a 
nonideal identity, it may become the focus of regulation. These 
illegitimate justifications may fuel both the impetus for regulation 
and the form that regulation takes—regulatory impulses fueled by 
illegitimate ideological justifications may tend towards prohibition 
rather than conditional permission. 
Prohibitionism has an additional and centrally important quality in 
that it tends to reinforce the negative aspects of the prohibited activity 
and thereby strengthens the justifications for prohibition. This 
feedback loop is created by banishing the activity into the realm of 
unregulated criminal enterprise. The activity is therefore unmitigated 
by the kinds of harm-reducing regulations that are administered in a 
conditional-permission mode, so that the potential harms from the 
activity itself are at their maximum. Moreover, the harms that might 
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arise from the activity itself are joined by auxiliary harms that arise 
from the criminal mode of production, such as violence and extortion. 
(These dynamics are discussed in more detail in Part V.) 
Prohibition has a final quality, which is that it criminalizes the 
supplying population. Where underlying economic and social 
dynamics locate production within particular kinds of the population, 
prohibition will extend the criminal identity of that population. This 
is a second feedback loop that has to do not with the activity but with 
the suppliers of the activity. The participation of a given population 
in the act of supply may arise from an illegitimate ideological 
justification that perceives that population as a threat to identity; the 
criminalization of the activity produces criminality in this population 
which enhances the basis for the justification. (This is discussed more 
in Part V and Part VI.) 
II. THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN NORMAL AND ABNORMAL MARKET 
ACTIVITY IN LIBERAL REGIMES 
A. The Dichotomy 
We have now established the need for justifications to mediate the 
tension between the self-consciously liberal state and intervention in 
the market. We have also established that these justifications 
explicitly take the ideologically legitimate forms of preventing harm 
to others, firstly, and preventing harm to oneself, more qualifiedly; 
but the impetus for and result of these justifications may also be 
influenced by less often expressed, and ideologically more 
problematic, concerns related to perceived threats against the identity 
of the nation-state. 
The result of all of this is to create in a liberal regime a dichotomy 
between “normal” market activity, which is subject to the ―normal‖ 
and less visible regulatory mode of supporting the market, and 
“abnormal” market activity, which is subject to the abnormal and 
more visible regulatory mode of prohibition. 
Prohibiting the abnormal becomes the site of the expression of 
both universalized and particularistic public identity as well as the 
site of the visible, justified exercise of public power. The ―state‖ here 
is not only the contractarian vision (Locke‘s and Mills‘) of a 
protector of civil rights and liberties or the domain of civic 
participation (Aristotle, Rousseau) but also the site of coercion and 
violence (Hobbes, Nietzsche, Weber). 
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―Power‖ here is coercion, but coercion is partially a product of 
social consent (Gramsci, Foucault). Institutionally, this means that 
power is exercised not only by the state ―on‖ society but also by 
society, and actors and groups within society, ―on‖ the state. 
―Governance‖ is the product of these interactions. Hence, regulation 
is the result of combined activities of actors through the lever of the 
state, influenced by and influencing the regulatory framework. 
The market is the domain of exchange (Smith), an inherently 
disruptive force (Marx), and the product of regularized and relatively 
less visible coercion (Hale). The market is also a site for the 
production of identity through regulation, by regulating in such a way 
that sets up a dichotomy between normal and abnormal market 
activities that pay allegiance to the ideal form (Tarullo). 
Prohibitionist public-health regulations will seek to fend off and close 
down the markets for illicit products and services, such as illegal 
drugs, illegal labor, and illegal sex, although the market‘s own 
dynamics do not differentiate between these and others. 
Because the dynamics of supply, demand, exchange, and profit 
themselves potentially apply everywhere, and because they produce 
results that sometimes resemble but sometimes contradict it, the 
maintenance of the normal and abnormal market is an ongoing, 
uneasy affair.9 
As a mélange of theories, this general analytical framework runs 
the risk of pastiche, which is incoherence. Nevertheless, it seeks to 
provide a persuasive conceptual account of why liberal states 
criminalize—or perhaps a better term would be how, that is the 
conceptual nature of the reasons that liberalism gives itself when it 
turns to prohibition. 
B. A Note on Methodology 
This account is a dynamic one in that it envisions regulation as a 
process of interaction between these actors. It shares this dynamic 
orientation with ―functionalist‖ and ―legal process‖ accounts of the 
 
9. Thus, antitrust regulations seek to preserve the ―ideal‖ ―normal‖ market, 
although the market‘s own dynamics will tend to lead it towards monopoly; 
antidumping trade regulations seek to preserve the ―ideal‖ ―normal‖ market, 
although the market‘s own dynamics will tend to lead it towards ―dumping.‖ Daniel 
K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 546, 549 (1987). 
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mid-twentieth century and with ―governance‖ theory of the current 
moment. 
The approach to governance employed here is, however, a critical 
one. The critique is animated by the following perspectives: (1) a 
legal realist approach: that is, a focus on the background conditions 
and distributional consequences of the framework; (2) a 
poststructuralist approach: that is, a focus on the role of ideals and 
discourses in addition to material conditions and institutions; and (3) 
a progressive approach: that is, a desire to identify and resolve those 
dynamics that structurally subordinate individuals and groups.  
The analytical account is not only descriptive but also critical 
along these lines, in that it attempts to expose within the 
contemporary framework: (1) the ways in which the legal rules 
ignore or inadequately take into account the background conditions 
and distributional consequences of their operation; and (2) the ways 
in which the legal rules ignore or inadequately take into account their 
origin within and contribution to particularistic ideals and discourses 
the ways in which the legal rules ignore or inadequately take into 
account their structural subordination of individuals and groups. 
The remainder of this Paper applies the foregoing analytic to the 
issue of undocumented workers as a case study of fragmented legal 
systems coexisting ―in the same social field.‖10 
III. PLURAL LEGALITY IN THE SOCIAL FIELD OF UNAUTHORIZED 
MIGRANT WORKERS 
The array of international treaty systems actually or potentially 
affecting undocumented migrant workers fits Merry‘s definition of 
legal pluralism, in which one finds multiple legal orders not 
belonging to the same system but addressing the same social reality.11  
A. The “Liberal Egalitarian” Regimes of Trade and Human 
Rights 
1. Trade 
The multilateral trading regime is anchored by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the 1995 successor to the General Agreement 
 
10. Merry, supra note 1, at 870. 
11. In this version of the Paper, I do not attempt to incorporate an analysis of 
regional treaties; this is the basis of ongoing research that will hopefully bear fruit 
in the next version. 
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on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). For most of its history, the trade 
regime dealt only with trade in goods, but with its expansion into the 
WTO included new rules addressing cross-border transactions 
involving flows of people.  
The central principle of the World Trade Organization is 
nondiscrimination, as embodied, inter alia, in the doctrine of 
―national treatment,‖ which holds that national origin should not be a 
basis for discrimination in market access. At the same time, of 
course, there are many exceptions to this principle, and those 
exceptions can largely be understood as the product of political 
economy—they tend to represent areas in which government 
representatives determine that some subset of interest groups 
influencing state behavior wishes to continue policies of 
discrimination on the basis of national origin.   
In the trade regime‘s lingo, migrant labor is a sub-category of 
―trade in services‖ and so falls within the scope of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) established in 1995. Since 
the provision of services need not entail the movement of an actual 
person across a national border, not all categories, or ―Modes,‖ of 
GATS rules are relevant to our topic. The Mode that is most relevant 
is ―Mode 4,‖ temporary movement of natural persons.12 
The GATS is very limited in its potential to help undocumented 
workers. First, GATS Mode 4 does not address manufacturing or 
agriculture, excluding the very sectors which most commonly feature 
undocumented workers.13 Second, this exclusion within Mode 4 is 
accompanied by a de facto focus of the GATS, in its entire 
orientation, on high-skilled service sectors such as accounting and 
financial services. Third, the Annex to the GATS covering 
Movement of Natural Persons (Annex) does not provide any 
authorization for a worker to enter a country14 but stipulates only 
 
12. ―Trade in services‖ is defined as ―the supply of a service by a service 
supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the 
territory of any other Member.‖ General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex on 
Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services Under the Agreement, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 183, 185, 33 I.L.M. 1167, 1187 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. 
13. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., Service Providers on the Move: A 
Closer Look at Labor Mobility and the GATS, TD/TC/WP(2001)26/FINAL (Feb. 
20, 2002) [hereinafter OECD 2002]. 
14. GATS, supra note 12, Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying 
Services Under the Agreement [Annex on Movement of Natural Persons], para. 2, 
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certain constraints (such as nondiscrimination and national treatment) 
once that authorized worker does enter.   
WTO members are currently engaged in the ―Doha‖ Round of 
Negotiations, launched by the 2001 WTO Ministerial Conference and 
accompanying Ministerial Declaration (the Doha Declaration) setting 
forth goals for negotiations. For the first time ever, the WTO is 
fielding serious proposals by member states to include negotiations 
on low-skilled labor migration.  
The Doha Declaration states that ―negotiations on trade in services 
shall be conducted with a view to promoting the economic growth of 
all trading partners and the development of developing and least-
developed countries.‖15 The negotiations on trade in services are 
expected to form an important part of the results for the Doha round. 
The Declaration calls for a focus on rules governing movement of 
natural persons and the effect of those rules on prospects for 
development. 
Developing-country members of the WTO are increasingly 
concerned with addressing low-skilled labor migration head on, 
particularly since many are significant exporters of such labor. 
Several countries have offered proposals that would elaborate rules 
on the movement of natural persons, and some of these proposals 
directly link movement of natural persons with development.16 
Perhaps the boldest call, however, has come from the United Nations 
Development Programme, which has urged the negotiation of WTO 
 
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1127 (―[T]he Agreement shall not apply to measures 
affecting natural persons seeking access to the employment market of a Member, 
nor shall it apply to measures regarding citizenship, residence or employment on a 
permanent basis.‖). 
15. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002). 
16. See Communication from India, Proposed Liberalization of Movement of 
Professionals under General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), S/CSS/W/12 
(Nov. 24, 2000); Communication from United States, Movement of Natural 
Persons, S/CSS/W/29 (Dec. 18 2000); Communication from Japan, Movement of 
Natural Persons, S/CSS/W/42/Suppl.2 (July 6, 2001); Communication from EC, 
GATS 2000: Temporary Movement of Service Suppliers, S/CSS/W/45 (March 14, 
2001); Communication from Canada, Initial Negotiating Proposal on Temporary 
Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the GATS (Mode 4), 
S/CSS/W/48, (March 14, 2001); Communication from Colombia, Proposal for 
Negotiations on the Provision of Services Through Movement of Natural Persons, 
S/CSS/W/97 (July 9, 2001). 
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rules liberalizing constraints on low-skilled labor migration.17 
There have been some negotiations regarding the creation of a 
basis for easier authorization of workers who fall into the GATS 
categories. The so-called GATS visa has been promoted by the 
Indian government as well as U.S. and European businesses.18 This 
would effectively amend the Annex. However, even were the GATS 
visa to be negotiated, it would not be likely to aid the most vulnerable 
populations because of the limitations stated above. GATS Mode 4 
has been characterized by low levels of participation by WTO 
Members, so it is unlikely to expand to transcend the limitations 
stated above.19 
2. Human Rights 
If international trade law leaves undocumented migrant workers 
without recourse, what does international human rights law offer? 
Does the human rights framework provide some basis on which 
illegal migrants, by virtue of their humanity, might enjoy rights?   
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)20 defines the principle of nondiscrimination in this way: 
Each State Party undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.21 
 
17. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME & KAMAL MOHOTRA, 
MAKING GLOBAL TRADE WORK FOR PEOPLE 274–75 (2003). 
18. Richard Self & B. K. Zutshi, Temporary Entry of Natural Persons as 
Service Providers: Issues and Challenges in Further Liberalization Under the 
Current GATS Negotiations, at 25 (2002), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ser 
v_e/symp_apr_02_zutshi_self_e.doc. 
19. OECD 2002, supra note 13, at 6. Although regional systems are not 
addressed in this Paper, many of them—with the exception of the EU policy of free 
movement of persons with EU citizenship—have a similar effect. The NAFTA 
streamlines some entry requirements for skilled professionals. South-South regional 
agreements, such as the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement and the African 
Economic Community, do not mention services or migrant labor at all. 
20. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, T.I.A.S. 
No. 14668, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
21. Id. art. 2(1). Moreover, the ICCPR grants an effective remedy for ―any 
person whose rights and freedoms as herein recognized are violated. Id. art. 2(2). 
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The italicized language suggests that migrant workers, even if 
undocumented, should be able to exercise rights equal to any other 
person in a State Party‘s territory. 
A General Comment on the Position of Aliens Under the Covenant 
seeks to draw attention to this language.22 The Comment states that: 
[T]he general rule is that each one of the rights of the 
Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination between 
citizens and aliens. . . . However, the Committee‘s experience 
in examining reports shows that in a number of countries . . . 
rights that aliens should enjoy under the Covenant are denied 
to them or are subject to limitations that cannot always be 
justified under the Covenant.23 
Is such commentary intended to establish a right of entry for 
migrant workers? The Committee hastened to qualify its 
interpretation by stating that the treaty ―does not recognize the right 
of aliens to enter or to reside in the territory of a State party. It is in 
principle a matter for the State to decide who it will admit to its 
territory.‖24 
At the same time, the Committee indicated ―in certain 
circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant 
even in relation to entry or residence, for example, when 
considerations of non-discrimination, prohibition of inhuman 
treatment and respect for family life arise.‖25 What the precise nature 
of such circumstances would be, however, remained unspecified. 
Thus, the overarching nature of the nondiscrimination principle in 
the ICCPR seems to give the state the right to say who can come in 
and who has to go, but once the alien is within, the territory cannot 
discriminate. Although the question of lawful status is not explicitly 
mentioned here, one can surmise that its omission is intentional. 
 
22. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No. 
15: The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant, para. 1 (November 4, 1986) 
(―Reports from States parties have often failed to take into account that each State 
party must ensure the rights in the Covenant to ‗all individuals within its territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction‘ (art. 2, para. 1). In general, the rights set forth in the 
Covenant apply to everyone, irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of his or 
her nationality or statelessness.‖).   
23. Id. para. 2.   
24. Id. para 5. (emphasis added).   
25. Id. 
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This inference becomes stronger when one considers another part 
of the General Comment which states that, ―[o]nce an alien is 
lawfully within a territory, his freedom of movement within the 
territory and his right to leave that territory may only be restricted in 
accordance with article 12(3).‖26 Since this is the only place where 
lawful status is explicitly mentioned, one can be even more confident 
in interpreting the lack of explicit mention as intentional. This would 
support the application of the nondiscrimination principle regardless 
of lawful status. The familiar canon of legal interpreation, exclusio 
unio inclusio alterius, can be applied to conclude that the fact that 
lawful status is mentioned here but not elsewhere suggests that, with 
respect to the other principles, lawful status is not a basis for 
distinction. 
What about specific rights of particular interest to migrant 
workers, such as the right to organize? The ICCPR establishes that 
―[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of association with 
others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the 
protection of interests.‖27 At the same time, this right is subject to 
―restrictions . . . prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security or public safety, public 
order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.‖28 Whether such restrictions would 
include those distinguishing documented from undocumented 
workers, notwithstanding the General Comment discussed above, has 
not been explicitly addressed.   
Whether established international human rights law confers such 
rights as nondiscrimination and freedom of association on migrant 
workers, and on what basis, is a question that also requires 
examination of the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (the 
Migrant Workers Convention).29 The Convention entered into force 
in December 2002 after receiving the last ratification necessary for its 
entry into force thirteen years after its initial adoption as a Resolution 
of the United Nations General Assembly in 1990. 
 
26. Id. para. 8.  
27. ICCPR, supra note 20, art. 22(1). 
28. Id. art. 22(2). 
29. International Covenant on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 93. 
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Article 1 of the Migrant Workers Convention provides that the 
right against discrimination ―shall apply during the entire migration 
process of migrant workers and their families, which comprises 
preparation for migration, departure, transit and the entire period of 
stay and remunerated activity . . . as well as return . . . .‖30   
Unlike the trade regime, this rule of nondiscrimination is not 
limited to particular sectors listed by state parties but rather applies to 
any person ―who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in 
a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a 
national.‖31 Moreover, although the Convention distinguishes 
between ―documented‖ and ―non-documented‖ workers elsewhere, 
such distinction is not present either in this article, its 
nondiscrimination article,32 or its article establishing the right to form 
and join trade unions.33 The inference that these principles should not 
turn on document status is particularly strengthened by the fact that 
the Convention contains a separate section on the rights of 
―documented‖ migrant workers and their families.34 
Thus, international human rights law could be argued to extend to 
illegal migrant workers principles perceived as foundational to the 
human rights system. As such, international human rights law 
extends liberal egalitarianism further than international trade law, 
although how far depends on interpretive questions that have yet to 
be resolved. At the same time, multilateral human rights enforcement 
is ineffective in terms of the provision of recourse for individual 
claimants.35 
Predating human rights treaties are the treaties of the International 
Labor Organization, which include the Convention on the Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize36 and the 
 
30. Id. art. 1(2). 
31. Id. art. 2(1). This includes ―frontier worker,‖ ―seasonal worker,‖ ―seafarer,‖ 
―worker in an offshore installation,‖ ―itinerant worker,‖ ―project-tied worker,‖ 
―specified employment worker,‖ and ―self-employed worker.‖ Id. art. 2(2). 
32. Id. art. 7.  
33. Id. art. 26. 
34. Id. arts. 36–56. 
35. Regional human rights systems may harbor more potential. See Connie de la 
Vega & Conchita Lozano-Batista, Advocates Should Use Applicable International 
Standards to Address Violations of Undocumented Migrant Workers‟ Rights in the 
United States, 3 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 35 (2005) (describing the Inter-
American human rights system).   
36. International Labour Organization, Freedom of Association and Protection 
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Convention on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining.37 
Article 2 of the Freedom of Association Convention provides that the 
Convention applies, on its own terms, ―without distinction 
whatsoever‖; and Article 1 of the Collective Bargaining Convention 
requires ―adequate protection against acts of anti-union 
discrimination.‖ Thus, international labor law would also appear to 
be a basis for extending basic civil and political individual rights to 
migrant workers. Although the International Labour Organization 
(the ILO) does have a Committee which undertakes fact-finding and 
reporting, it too does little in the way of enforcement. (The ILO 
process will be taken up again in Part III, below.) 
B. The Prohibitionist Regime: Criminal Laws 
In 2000, the international criminal law against illegal markets 
expanded dramatically with the establishment and rapid entry into 
force of a new complex of multilateral agreements negotiated at 
Palermo under the auspices of the Vienna-based UN Office on Drugs 
and Crime Control: the Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime (the Organized Crime Convention)38 and two Protocols, the 
Migrant Smuggling Protocol39 and the Trafficking in Persons 
Protocol40 (collectively, the Crime Conventions). Together with the 
already-existing Drug Convention,41 the overall goal is to harmonize 
states‘ prohibition and prosecution of illicit market transactions. 
These multilateral policing efforts contain both substantive and 
institutional dimensions. Substantively, the agreements establish 
harmonized definitions of criminal offenses relating to ―core‖ illicit 
 
of the Right to Organize Convention, Gen. Conf. No. 87 (July 9, 1948).  
37. International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning the Application 
of the Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively, Gen. Conf. 
No. 98 (June 8, 1949).  
38. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 
15, 2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-16, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 [hereinafter Organized 
Crime Convention]. 
39. U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, Protocol Against the Smuggling by Land, Sea and 
Air, supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 
Annex III; UN Doc. A/55/383 (2000) [hereinafter Migrant Smuggling Protocol]. 
40. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, Nov. 15, 2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-16, 2237 U.N.T.S. 
319 [hereinafter Trafficking Protocol]. 
41. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, SEN. TREATY DOC. NO. 101-4, 1582 U.N.T.S. 165 
[hereinafter Drug Convention]. 
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markets. The Drug Convention requires member states to criminalize 
manufacturing, sale, transport, and possession of narcotics as well as 
related profit;42 the Organized Crime Convention requires member 
states to criminalize participation in a criminal group, money 
laundering, corruption of public officials, and obstruction of justice;43 
the Migrant Smuggling Protocol requires member states to 
criminalize the transport of migrants without valid travel 
documentation and related uses of fraudulent travel documents;44 and 
the Trafficking Protocol requires member states to criminalize the 
―trafficking of persons‖ as defined in the Protocol.45 
 
42. See id. art. 3 (establishing as a criminal offense the ―production, 
manufacture, . . . offering for sale, distribution, sale, delivery . . . , . . . transport, 
importation or exportation of any narcotic drug or any psychotropic substance‖; the 
―conversion or transfer‖ or the ―acquisition, possession or use‖ of property, 
knowing that it is derived; and aiding or abetting in any of the foregoing). 
43. Organized Crime Convention, supra note 38, art. 5 (establishing as an 
offense the act of ―[a]greeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious 
crime for a purpose relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining of a financial or 
other material benefit and, where required by domestic law, involving an act 
undertaken by one of the participants in furtherance of the agreement or involving 
an organized criminal group‖; the ―action‖ requirement is a consequence of the 
nonrecognition of the crime of conspiracy in the civil law system); Id. art. 6 
(establishing as an offense the ―conversion or transfer of property, knowing that 
such property is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising 
the illicit origin of the property‖); Id. art. 8 (establishing as an offense the ―promise, 
offering or giving to a public official‖ or ―solicitation or acceptance by a public 
official,‖ ―directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or 
herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from 
acting in the exercise of his or her official duties‖); Id. art. 23 (establishing as a 
criminal offense, when committed intentionally, ―the use of physical force, threats 
or intimidation or the . . . offering . . . of an undue advantage to induce false 
testimony or to interfere in the giving of testimony or the production of evidence‖ 
or otherwise ―to interfere with the exercise of official duties by a justice or law 
enforcement official‖ in a proceeding in relation to the commission of offences 
covered by this Convention‖). 
44. Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 39, art. 6 (establishing as a 
criminal offense, ―when committed intentionally and in order to obtain, directly or 
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit,‖ smuggling of migrants, or 
producing, providing, procuring or possessing a fraudulent travel or identity 
document when such acts ―committed for the purpose of enabling the smuggling of 
migrants‖). 
45. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 40, art. 5. The Trafficking Protocol requires 
criminalization of trafficking, defined as: ―the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other 
forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of 
a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose 
of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the 
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Institutionally, the agreements give fairly detailed guidelines46 for 
the coordination of law enforcement among member states in 
combating these criminal offenses.47 If a state party refuses the 
 
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or 
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs.‖  Id. art. 3. The Trafficking Protocol specifies that ―the consent of a victim 
of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation [as defined in the Protocol] 
shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in [the Protocol] have been 
used.‖ Id. art. 3(b).   
 The definition of trafficking in the Protocol has been very controversial, 
particularly within communities of feminist theorists and women‘s rights 
advocates. See generally Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir & Chantal 
Thomas, From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses: Four 
Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 336 
(2006). 
46. There is also a more general obligation to cooperate. See Organized Crime 
Convention, supra note 38, art. 27 (―States Parties shall cooperate closely with one 
another, consistent with their respective domestic legal and administrative 
systems,‖ especially in aid of conducting inquiries regarding identity of persons or 
property related to crimes; and general exchange of information.). The Drug and 
Crime Conventions, for example, have established progressively more extensive 
obligations relating to extradition. For an account of this progression towards 
―thick‖ institutional obligations, see Chantal Thomas, Disciplining Globalization: 
International Law, Illegal Trade, and the Case of Narcotics, 24 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 
549, 570–71 (2003) (internal citations omitted) (―The 1961 Convention said 
relatively little about the institutional mechanics of punishing illicit trade, but it did 
establish basic standards for extradition of offenders. . . . The 2000 Convention 
expanded the bases for extradition to include not only those acts defined as offenses 
under the treaty, but also any other act involving an ‗organized criminal group‘ that 
constituted an offense in both countries. The 1988 and 2000 Conventions 
developed additional mechanisms to increase efficacy in criminal enforcement. 
Both conventions progressively expanded subject matter jurisdiction. They also 
multiplied the bases for confiscation of narcotics materials and instruments. Each 
convention also contributed unique techniques to the enforcement arsenal. The 
1988 Convention allowed for and encouraged eradication of illicit crops. The 2000 
[Organized Crime] Convention allows Member States to use ‗special investigative 
techniques, such as electronic or other forms of surveillance and undercover 
operations‘ to aid enforcement. The 2000 Convention also requires members to 
‗institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for banks 
and non-bank financial institutions . . . in order to deter and detect all forms of 
money laundering.‖). 
47. The conventions also require member states to meet some 
institutionalization requirements vis-à-vis purely domestic enforcement, but these 
appear to be designed to establish a baseline conducive to intergovernmental 
cooperation with law enforcement authorities from other states. For example, a 
state party to the Organized Crime Convention must ensure a minimum domestic 
criminal law environment by establishing formal sanctions for the Convention‘s 
defined criminal offenses. See Organized Crime Convention, supra note 38, art. 11 
(Members ―must establish sanctions to punish conspiracy/involvement, laundering, 
corruption and obstruction of justice‖; ―[e]ach State Party shall make the 
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request of another state party to extradite an individual, it becomes 
subject to an obligation to prosecute that individual internally.48 There 
are also extensive provisions regarding ―mutual legal assistance‖ 
during the stages of criminal investigation that antecede formal 
indictment and extradition.49 In addition, the conventions establish 
bases for coordinating the policing of borders against illegal 
migrants50 by allowing states to extend immigration-related 
investigations extraterritorially into commercial carriers under the 
control or auspices of other state parties.51 Both ―smuggled migrants‖ 
 
commission of an offence [of organized crime, money laundering, corruption, and 
obstruction of justice] . . . liable to sanctions that take into account the gravity of 
that offence.‖) Further guidance related to specific penalties and techniques is 
hortatory rather than mandatory. Id. art. 12 (noting on confiscation that ―States 
Parties shall adopt, to the greatest extent possible within their domestic legal 
systems, such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation‖); id. art. 20 
(noting on surveillance that ―[i]f permitted by the basic principles of its domestic 
legal system, each State Party shall, within its possibilities and under the conditions 
prescribed by its domestic law, take the necessary measures to allow for the 
appropriate use of controlled delivery and, where it deems appropriate, for the use 
of other special investigative techniques, such as electronic or other forms of 
surveillance and undercover operations‖); id. art. 28 (noting on cooperation with 
law enforcement that ―[e]ach State Party shall take appropriate measures to 
encourage persons who participate or who have participated in organized criminal 
groups: (a) To supply information useful to competent authorities for investigative 
and evidentiary purposes . . .‖). 
 Note that States Parties must make criminal such offenses not only when they 
involve a transnational component but also even if they are wholly domestic. Id. 
art. 34 (―The offences [on conspiracy or other ‗participation in an organized 
criminal group,‘ laundering, corruption, and obstruction of justice] . . . shall be 
established in the domestic law of each State Party independently of the 
transnational nature‖ of the activity.). 
48. See id. art. 16(10) (―A State Party in whose territory an alleged offender is 
found, if it does not extradite such person in respect of an offence to which this 
article applies solely on the ground that he or she is one of its nationals, shall, at the 
request of the State Party seeking extradition, be obliged to  submit the case 
without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.‖). 
49. See id. art. 18 (defining mutual legal assistance as taking evidence or 
statements from persons; effecting service of judicial documents; executing 
searches and seizures, and freezing; examining objects and sites; and providing 
information, evidentiary items and expert evaluations). 
50. See Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 39, art. 11(1) (―Without 
prejudice to international commitments in relation to the free movement of people, 
States Parties shall strengthen, to the extent possible, such border controls as may 
be necessary to prevent and detect the smuggling of migrants.‖). 
51. Id. art. 11. See also Trafficking Protocol, supra note 40, art. 11 (extending 
obligation to strengthen border controls to ―commercial carriers‖ by requiring 
―commercial carriers . . . to ascertain that all passengers are in possession of the 
travel documents required for entry into the receiving State‖); id. art. 8 
(encouragement of cooperation with investigation of sea vessels). 
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and ―trafficked persons‖52 can be returned home by the ―receiving‖ 
state party, and both must be accepted by the ―sending‖ state party.53 
C. Comparison with Trade and Human Rights Regimes 
The international criminal law regime appears quite robust when 
compared with its rather feebler counterparts in trade and human 
rights. Despite the relative strength of the WTO generally, the 
existing subdivision governing trade in services is much less 
effectual. This is because, as indicated above, in services the basic 
WTO disciplines of nondiscrimination and national treatment apply 
only to those sectors that are voluntarily made subject to them—this 
contrasts with the rules governing trade in goods or intellectual 
property, where these principles automatically apply.54 And within 
the relatively weak division of trade in services, those provisions 
governing migrant (temporary) labor are the weakest and most 
qualified. Substantively, the rules formally exclude unauthorized 
labor from their purview, as well as those sectors in which 
undocumented migrant workers are likely to work. The practical 
effect of the trade regime is to confer the privileges of liberalization 
only to high-skilled workers. 
The human rights regime as it applies to undocumented migrant 
workers would appear to offer, in terms of its substantive content, 
some form of protection to unauthorized migrants, and in that sense it 
is stronger than the trade rules. However, the Migrant Workers 
Convention is hampered by a lack of signatories. The ICCPR, 
although it has more signatories and so could presumably be used to 
 
52. The conceptual distinction between ―smuggled migrants‖ and ―trafficked 
persons‖ rests on voluntariness: the smuggled migrant is said to have consented to 
being transported illegally, whereas the trafficked person has encountered fraud, 
force, or some other mode of coercion. In practice, this distinction can be very hard 
to maintain. Conceptually, this distinction reflects a deep ambivalence in socio-
legal commitments to contract and market as regulatory tools. 
53. See, e.g., Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 39, art. 18(1) (―Each 
State Party agrees to facilitate and accept, without undue or unreasonable delay, the 
return of a person who has been the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this 
Protocol and who is its national or who has the right of permanent residence in its 
territory at the time of return.‖); Trafficking Protocol, supra note 40, art. 8(1) (―The 
State Party of which a victim of trafficking in persons is a national or in which the 
person had the right of permanent residence at the time of entry into the territory of 
the receiving State Party shall facilitate and accept, with due regard for the safety of 
that person, the return of that person without undue or unreasonable delay.‖).   
54. The Doha round includes an effort to expand the commitments under trade 
in services; since it is subject to controversy, it is uncertain how this will turn out. 
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reinforce the principle of protecting the human rights of 
undocumented migrant workers, is limited in its ability to offer any 
recourse to right-holders. In addition, signatories like the United 
States would argue, albeit not without controversy, that their 
reservations to the treaty restrict potential right-holders to that 
recourse offered under domestic constitutional law.55 That recourse, 
as shall be discussed below, has been spotty and seems to be 
shrinking over time. 
The international criminal law treaties have many more 
participating members than the Migrant Workers Convention or the 
GATS.56  Moreover, unlike either of these two conventions, the 
international criminal law treaties contain a great deal of 
administrative obligations—specifications as to how state parties 
should go about implementing the treaty‘s provisions. The apparatus 
established by these conventions is thus much broader in its purview 
and authority.   
In terms of enforcement, the international criminal law treaties do 
not feature the type of dispute settlement mechanism found in the 
WTO. In that sense, they could be argued to suffer from the same 
form of institutional frailty that typifies most public international law 
instruments. At the same time, however, the multilateral agreements 
are supplemented by a wide variety of regional, bilateral, and 
unilateral practices, typically spearheaded by ―receiving‖ countries. 
The United States, for example, provides extensive aid, funding, and 
military training to Latin America to combat the drug trade.57 The 
 
55. See 138 Cong. Rec. S4, 781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2. 1992) (setting forth Senate 
reservations to the ICCPR). For challenges to the validity of reservations, see 
generally Lori F. Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning 
“Self-Executing” and “Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515 
(1991); David Weissbrodt, The United States Ratification of Human Rights 
Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REV. 35 (1978). 
56. Although all WTO Members are formally signatories to the GATS, the fact 
that GATS principles apply only to those sectors for which members have actively 
made concessions, and the fact that only a minority of members have made such 
concessions, effectively means the level of participation is low. See OECD 2002, 
supra note 13, at 30 (stating that the ―the ratio of full liberalization in Mode 4 
market access ranges from 0 to 4%, compared with 18–59% in Mode 1 (cross-
border, such as e-commerce), 24–69% in Mode 2 (consumption abroad, such as 
foreign outpatients), and 0–31% in Mode 3 (commercial presence, such as foreign 
subsidiaries‖)). 
57. Examples include Plan Colombia, providing U.S. assistance to Colombia, 
and the Andean Pact, providing trade and aid programs to Colombia, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, and Peru. See Supplemental Agreement for Cooperation and Technical 
THOMAS MACRO - 5-14-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2010  2:56 PM 
2010] FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL ORDER 209 
European Union‘s Department of Justice and Home Affairs maintains 
extensive working relationships with Europol, the Task Force of EU 
Police Chiefs, the European Police College (CEPOL), Interpol, and 
the Council of Europe.58   
Thus, as a normative matter, the international criminal law treaties 
seem to be operating to justify and reinforce efforts by Northern 
―receiving‖ states to strengthen not only their internal prosecutions of 
illegal transactions but also their pursuit of strong cooperative 
mechanisms with Southern ―supplier‖ states. The most salient 
example, but far from the only one, is the U.S. Department of State‘s 
system of categorizing governments according to the efforts they 
have made to combat trafficking in persons. Countries are placed on 
one of four ―tiers‖ according to the level of effort they have made in 
this vein. The Department of State is authorized to withhold foreign 
aid from those recipient governments that have not made sufficient 
efforts. The kinds of efforts that are viewed most favorably are those 
that strengthen the police and prosecutorial functions of the 
government. This watch list has proven enormously successful; so 
much so that even governments that neither receive nor require U.S. 
foreign aid, such as Japan, have hastened to change their practices to 
counter the reputational cost of an adverse assessment.59 
The Trafficking Protocol, of course, has at its center the goal of 
reducing the suffering of victims of ―modern-day slavery.‖ To that 
end, the Protocol does contain language promoting the protection of 
 
Assistance in Defense and Security Between the Governments of the United States 
of America and the Republic of Columbia art. 3(1), Mar. 11, 2009, Temp. State 
Dept. No. 09-200, Hein‘s No. KAV 8780, available at http://www.state.gov/docum 
ents/organization/131654.pdf; Letter to Congressional Leaders Transmitting a 
Report Concerning a Review of the Performance of Bolivia and Ecuador as Set 
Forth in the Andean Trade Preference Act, Daily Comp. Pres. Doc., 2009 DCPD 
No. 00525 (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.politico.com/static/PPM136_0 
91112_bho_letter.html. 
58. These activities are coordinated through Directorate D of the Directorate-
General for Justice, Freedom and Security. The mandate for the EU‘s regional and 
supranational initiatives arises from the objective that the European Union be an 
―area of freedom, security and justice.‖ Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community art. 1(3), Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. 
(C 340) 3 (Treaty of Amsterdam). See also Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community arts. 17–22, 39–47, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 4 (Treaty 
of Rome).  
59. See generally Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using 
Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 437 
(2006). 
THOMAS MACRO - 5-14-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2010  2:56 PM 
210 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 25:187 
human rights of trafficking victims. However, whereas the Protocol‘s 
language relating to criminalization and repatriation establishes 
mandatory obligations, the provisions relating to assistance of victims 
and human rights protection are aspirational.60 
Again, to look at the actions of the U.S. government, this apparent 
emphasis on criminal prosecution over victim assistance is reflected. 
For example, the U.S. anti-trafficking statute enacted 
contemporaneously with the Protocol provides that persons who have 
been trafficked into the United States might be able to benefit from a 
special visa created for them (the T visa), which would allow them to 
avoid returning to the presumably dangerous circumstances that 
caused them to be trafficked in the first place. However, despite the 
Department of State‘s estimate that up to twenty to fifty thousand 
people are trafficked into the U.S. annually, the statute allows for 
only five thousand of these visas to be conferred annually. Of the 
allowed visas, only a fraction are actually issued.61 Finally, even in 
this victim-assistance mode, criminal prosecution is paramount: the 
visa is conditional upon the victim‘s certified cooperation with police 
authorities—activity that could arguably increase the vulnerability of 
the victim, or the victim‘s family or loved ones, to retaliation by the 
traffickers.62 
Finally, although the scope of ―trafficking in persons‖ 
definitionally includes a wide range of forced labor situations, in 
practice the discourse around trafficking has focused on combating 
and abolishing prostitution.63 In the U.S. context, the Bush 
Administration explicitly included the criminalization of prostitution 
among its conditions for foreign assistance. Efforts by legal services 
and NGOs in the U.S. seeking to protect migrant workers in, for 
 
60. Compare Trafficking Protocol, supra note 40, art. 5 (on criminalization: 
states ―shall . . . establish . . .  criminal offenses.‖), art. 8 (on repatriation: states 
―shall facilitate and accept . . . the return of [a victim of trafficking].‖), with id. art. 
6 (on the establishment of social services programs: states ―shall consider 
implementing measures to provide for the physical, psychological and social 
recovery of victims.‖), art. 7 (on the status of victims: states ―shall consider 
adopting . . . measures that permit victims of trafficking . . . to remain in . . . 
territory.‖).  
61. See, e.g., U.S. STATE DEP‘T., ANNUAL REPORT ON THE TRAFFICKING IN 
PERSONS (2004). 
62. See generally Thomas et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist 
Legal Responses, supra note 2.  
63. See supra, note 45. 
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example, agricultural or domestic labor have so far been unable to tap 
into the protections offered by the anti-trafficking statute.64 
IV. THE SYMBOLIC AND NORMATIVE ORDERING EFFECTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
Beyond its specific institutional authoritativeness, international 
criminal law against illegal markets, by criminalizing the suppliers, 
has the effect of throwing a shadow of suspicion over entire regions 
of the world that are viewed thereafter as suppliers of criminality.  
The atmosphere of fear and paranoia in developed countries 
against those lawless wilds outside their borders both enables and is 
enhanced by the expansion of the prohibitionist regime. Certainly, in 
a post-9/11 world in which major political powers have declared an 
ongoing state of heightened alert, the social atmosphere may be one 
in which popular concerns in developed countries around increased 
economic instability in the globalization era very easily dovetail with 
increases in perceived criminal dangers beyond borders. 
Thus, globalization seems to be twinned with increasing border 
paranoia. That such sentiments concretely affect international affairs 
was reflected, for example, in remarks given by Jan Eliasson, the 
President of the Sixtieth Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly, calling for ―a strong effort for international openness‖ 
despite the perceived dangers of globalization: 
The free movement of people, ideas—and merchandise, of 
course—is important and has contributed enormously to the 
positive change in the recent decade. But if that outside world 
also, to many, is seen as a threat, the political forces are 
 
64. For example, legal services organizations in Central Texas were attempting 
to get T visas and other protections for undocumented Mexican workers who had 
been recruited to work in construction and hotels by employers who then had not 
paid them, knowing that the workers would likely be unable to seek any recourse 
against them. See, e.g., Thomas et al., From the International to the Local in 
Feminist Legal Responses, supra note 2, at 390–91(―These advocates describe such 
practices as enslavement because workers are not compensated for their labor. 
Moreover, employers take advantage of the vulnerability these workers suffer as a 
result of their undocumented status. So far, under State Department rules, if the 
employer simply chooses not to pay workers without threatening to turn them into 
immigration authorities, he is not considered to be ―trafficking.‖). Since such labor 
involved deception and was unpaid, these lawyers thought the workers could fairly 
be described to be victims of trafficking. These efforts have so far been 
unsuccessful.  
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fishing in murky waters and looking at migration and crime 
and so forth coming from that dangerous outside, then we are 
in trouble.65 
Some commentators have argued that moral panics, border 
paranoia, and other political anxieties that fuel national and 
international prohibitionist efforts stem from unconscious, deeply 
rooted, symbolic dynamics tying national identity to the physical 
body. Territorial integrity is associated with bodily integrity in this 
symbolic order. Openness to and presence of aliens contaminates the 
national body.66   
This discursive framework has perhaps most forcefully been 
articulated as ―biopower.‖ According to this concept, the symbology 
of the state as a body fuels ―the explosion of numerous and diverse 
techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of 
populations.‖67 In this way, the crime conventions‘ harmonization and 
coordination of criminal enforcement, extension of techniques such 
 
65. H.E. Jan Eliasson, Speech to Carnegie Council as Part of ―A Fairer 
Globalization‖ Series, The Progress of UN Reform (June 7, 2006) (transcript on 
file with the Maryland Journal of International Law) (emphasis added). 
66. For an exposition on this social dynamic in the U.S. in particular and 
especially during the period in which U.S. expansion overseas fueled anxiety about 
its cultural and political integrity, see generally AMY KAPLAN, THE ANARCHY OF 
EMPIRE IN THE MAKING OF U.S. CULTURE (2005). One of Kaplan‘s case studies is 
Downes v. Bidwell, the Supreme Court decision where, in a concurring opinion, 
three justices described Puerto Rico as ―foreign in a domestic sense‖ under U.S. 
law, so that the territory neither could demand sovereignty nor was subject to 
federal laws that were not expressly extended to it by the U.S. Congress. See 
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 320 (1901) (White, J., Shiras, J. & McKenna, J., 
concurring). For a critique of this position, see id. at 384 (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added) (―[T]he contention seems to be that, if an organized and settled 
province of another sovereignty is acquired by the United States, Congress has the 
power to keep it, like a disembodied shade, in an intermediate state of ambiguous 
existence for an indefinite period. . . . Great stress is thrown upon the word 
„incorporation,‟ as if possessed of some occult meaning.‖). Though it did not 
prevail in the particular case, the dissent‘s language in the Wong Kim Ark case must 
be read to be indicative of some goodly proportion of public sentiment: ―There 
should be some honor and dignity in American citizenship that would be sacred 
from the foul and corrupting taint of a debased alienage.‖ United States v. Wong 
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 675 (1898) (Fuller, J. & Harlan, J., dissenting), cited in 
Sanford Levinson, Installing the Insular Cases into the Canon of Constitutional 
Law, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 121 (Christina D. Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).  
67. 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 140 (1992). See also 
GLOBALIZATION UNDER CONSTRUCTION: GOVERNMENTALITY, LAW AND IDENTITY 
(Richard Warren Perry & Bill Maurer eds., 2003). 
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as extradition and information-sharing among states, and assurance of 
the repatriation of offending migrant bodies can all be seen as 
instances of biopower. 
The post-2001 tightening of connections between illegal markets 
and terrorism perhaps represents a further extension of this 
phenomenon. In this imaginary, every migrant entrant—and 
particularly those who are unauthorized—potentially harbors drugs, 
criminal organizational intentions, connections with prostitution, and 
ultimately connections with terrorism. The supranational integration 
of efforts to combat against such threats, in this line of thinking, 
unifies the ―discourse of terrorism‖ with the ―discourse of 
globalization.‖68 In this ―biopolitical‖ order, ―the ‗enemy‘ is 
simultaneously ‗banalized‘ (reduced to an object of routine police 
repression) and absolutized (as the Enemy, an absolute threat to the 
ethical order).‖69 
The effort to combat trafficking, in my view, both assuages the 
conscience of the would-be prosecutor and adds to the general alarm 
and atmosphere of anxiety that further enables the expansion of the 
police power through the creation of a ―moral panic.‖70 The 
conceptual unification of trafficking with prostitution, viewed in this 
light, can be seen as a particular and essential component in the 
growth of biopower. Sex contaminates the female body, and the 
contaminated female body in turn corrupts the social body.71 Hence, 
cross-border prostitution invokes the notion of a contaminant on 
many different levels.72   
The social reaction takes the form of a strong movement to repel 
 
68. WALTER BENN MICHAELS, THE SHAPE OF THE SIGNIFIER: 1967 TO THE END 
OF HISTORY 224 (2004). 
69. Id. at 224 (quoting MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 6 (2000)). 
70. See Thomas, supra note 46. 
71. For treatments of the relationship between the body, sexuality, and ―border 
phenomena,‖ see Siobhan Somerville, Scientific Racism and the Invention of the 
Homosexual Body, in THE GENDER/SEXUALITY READER 37 (Micaela di Leonardi & 
Roger Lancaster eds., 1997); Abdul R. JanMohamed, Sexuality on/of the Racial 
Border: Foucault, Wright and the Articulation of Racialized Sexuality, in 
DISCOURSES OF SEXUALITY: FROM ARISTOTLE TO AIDS 94 (Donna Stanton ed., 
1992 ); ANN STOLER, RACE AND THE EDUCATION OF DESIRE (1995); Biddy Martin 
& Chandra Mohanty, Feminist Politics: What Does Home Have To Do With It?, in 
FEMINIST STUDIES, CRITICAL STUDIES 191 (Teresa de Laurentis ed., 1986). 
72. ―Disgust concerns the borders of the body: it focuses on the prospect that a 
problematic substance may be incorporated into the self.‖ MARTHA NUSSBAUM, 
HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME AND THE LAW 88 (2004).  
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the contaminant. An historical review of anti-prostitution campaigns 
in the United States, for example, demonstrates that crackdowns have 
often arisen in social contexts that also featured anxiety about 
increased immigration.73 This explains why, although the putative 
focus is the assistance of the victims of trafficking, the actual 
responses are in the vein of criminal enforcement and border-
tightening.74 This disparity between the punitive elements of the legal 
 
73. First, the cross-border procurement of prostitution was criminalized both 
nationally and internationally. The 1910 Mann Act provided that ―[a]ny person 
who shall knowingly transport, or aid or assist in obtaining transportation for, or in 
transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce . . . any woman or girl for the 
purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose or with the 
intent and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl to become a 
prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral 
practice . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall 
be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000 or by imprisonment of not more than 
five years, or by both.‖ White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 
(1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–2424 (2006)). 
 The 2000 Trafficking Victims Protection Act establishes a criminal sentence for 
―severe forms of trafficking in persons,‖ which is defined to mean ―(A) sex 
trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or 
in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age;‖ 
or ―(B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a 
person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the 
purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.‖ 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7110 (2006)). 
 The Trafficking Protocol also calls for the establishment of criminal offences for 
the ―trafficking of persons,‖ which is defined to mean:  
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, 
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the 
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.  
See Trafficking Protocol, supra note 40, art. 5. Second, provisions were made for 
the ―victims‖ to be repatriated to their home countries. Id. art. 8. See also Kerry 
Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 641 (2005) (showing how immigration panics were influenced by 
the perception of widespread prostitution by immigrant women from China). 
74. Elizabeth M. Bruch, Models Wanted: The Search for an Effective Response 
to Human Trafficking, 40 STAN. J. INT‘L L. 1, 16, 32 (2004) (noting that, although 
trafficking can be addressed through a human rights framework, a labor framework, 
or a law enforcement framework, ―[a]ll of the international documents addressing 
human trafficking in detail have essentially embodied a law enforcement 
perspective,‖ and ―the law enforcement framework has dominated the international 
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response and the victim-assistance elements is consistent with an 
explanation of the law as primarily serving the ends, first, of building 
state power and, second, of assuaging cultural concerns about social 
identity.  
The ―constructivist‖ approach in international relations theory also 
offers an explanation linking these symbolic dynamics within states 
to the incentives affecting the coordination of state behavior. The 
constructivist approach to international relations would view those 
political and social fault lines not only as part of the explanation but 
as central and would investigate the ways in which ideas and cultures 
shape states‘ perceptions of their own interests. Constructivist 
theorists argue that ideas influence political behavior in a variety of 
ways, including serving as road maps in the face of uncertainty.75 
Employing the constructivist approach, the operative concept here 
is of social identity as an in-group versus out-group phenomenon. 
Beyond the liberal notion of individual human flourishing is Carl 
Schmitt‘s idea of fear as a ruling political emotion—―all political 
actions and motives can be reduced to the distinction between friend 
and enemy.‖76 This distinction becomes symbolically charged at the 
border.  
V. PROHIBITIONISM PROBABLY MAKES ILLEGAL MARKETS MORE 
DANGEROUS 
The normative ordering described above could be perceived by 
some as a legitimate—if controversial—corollary of the sociolegal 
facts of national identity, territorial sovereignty, and citizenship. 
However, the social benefits of policing identity must be considered 
in light of the probable social costs, which include the ironic, or 
tragic, likelihood that criminalizing markets in many cases probably 
does not decrease them but only renders them more violent. In this 
sense, the criminalization process turns into self-fulfilling prophecy: 
illegal markets are viewed as threats, fueling a crackdown which 
actually has the effect of amplifying the threat posed by said markets.  
The logic behind the likely futility of prohibitionism is 
 
response to human trafficking . . .‖). 
75. See generally IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS AND 
POLITICAL CHANGE (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993). 
76. CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 26 (George Schwab trans., 
1976). 
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fundamentally economic, stemming from the material conditions that 
produce and shape illicit transactions. In this section, I will discuss 
two arguments from economics that predict that prohibitionism 
exacerbates rather than reduces market criminality. In the context of 
undocumented migrant workers, this means that the incidence of 
illegal migration will not likely reduce in response to crackdowns but 
will likely become more dangerous for the migrants themselves and 
for society in general. 
The first argument is that illegal markets are deeply rooted in the 
dynamics of globalization: ―push‖ and ―pull‖ factors that 
criminalization will not affect. The second argument is that 
criminalization, though it will not necessarily reduce the level of 
illicit market activity in a significant way, will tend to shift the type 
of suppliers from a decentralized to a centralized one, thereby 
encouraging the growth of organized crime. 
A. “Push” and “Pull” Dynamics of Globalization 
The robustness of illicit markets arises out of three variables: deep 
demand, deep supply, and the capacity to connect the two in a global 
marketplace.   
The demand in industrialized ―receiving countries‖ for the illicit 
goods and services provided by developing countries and targeted by 
the Crime Conventions is extensive. Demand for illicit narcotics has 
not declined despite the decades-old War on Drugs.77 Employer 
demand for undocumented labor is all but an open secret in the 
U.S.,78 where undocumented migrant farm workers hired seasonally 
in the U.S. outnumber those workers who are legally admitted.79 U.S. 
 
77. U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, 2006 WORLD DRUG REPORT, at 33, U.N. 
Sales No. E.06.XI.10 (2006) (asserting that world drug consumption has ―remained 
stable‖ but warning that recent changes in methodology may account for the lack of 
increase). 
78. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Dunne, The Embarrassing Secret of Immigration 
Policy, 49 EMORY L.J. 623, 626–27 (2000). 
79. See RUTH ELLEN WASEM & GEOFFREY K. COLLVER, IMMIGRATION OF 
AGRICULTURAL GUEST WORKERS: POLICY, TRENDS, AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 1 
(2003) (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL 
AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY 1997–1998, Research Report No. 8 (March 
2000) (―U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) data estimate that, by 1999, over half  
(52%) of U.S. farm workers were unauthorized, up from 37% in 1995.‖)). In point 
of fact, the federal H-2A program ―exists to meet agricultural labor shortages‖ and 
has been recognized as the ―only thing standing between labor shortages and 
significant fines.‖ William M. Ross, The Road to H-2A and Beyond: An Analysis of 
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demand for services in the entertainment and prostitution industries 
associated with human trafficking is vast.80 
The return rate available to actors in ―sending countries‖ from 
supplying receiving-country demand in illicit sectors often exceeds 
that from legal foreign markets, not to mention local demand. The 
price Bolivian farmers can charge for coca base is at least fifty-fold 
the price available from legal crops such as coffee or soybeans.81 The 
average manufacturing wage in the U.S. was US$23.65, or US$31.81 
in the Netherlands, compared to US$2.63 in Mexico, or US$4.54 in 
Poland.82 The average income of a farm worker in the U.S. is very 
low by U.S. standards—below the poverty line at between 
US$10,000 and US$12,49983—but high by comparison to the average 
Mexican income of less than 5,000 pesos.84   
In addition to price comparisons as drivers of illicit demand and 
supply, global economic analysis points to the background dynamics 
of shifting resource allocations across markets. Globalization both 
dislocates local labor forces (through competition with imported 
products) and creates new labor forces (through the creation of new 
 
Migrant Worker Legislation in Agribusiness, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 267, 276–78 
(2000) (assessing the program).  
80. ELIZABETH BERNSTEIN, TEMPORARILY YOURS: SEXUAL COMMERCE IN 
POST-INDUSTRIAL CULTURE 1–7 (2007). 
81. In 1999, the ―farmgate‖ price per kilogram of coca base in Bolivia was 
estimated by the UN to be US$900. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL 
ILLICIT DRUG TRENDS 2000, at 46, U.N. Sales No. E.00.XI.10 (2000) [hereinafter 
GLOBAL ILLICIT DRUG TRENDS 2000]. In 1999, prices for Bolivia‘s major legal 
cash crops were US$19 per kilogram of coffee—about two percent of the going 
price for the equivalent amount of coca base; and about US$2 per kilo of 
soybeans—about 0.2 percent of the coca base price. See id.; FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. 
OF U.N., THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 2001, at 9, 13, (FAO Agriculture 
Series No. 33,2002) (reporting declining world prices per ton for coffee and only 
marginal increase for soybeans in 2000). 
82. UNITED STATES DEP‘T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF HOURLY COMPENSATION COSTS FOR 
PRODUCTION WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING, 2007, at 13 (2009), available at: 
www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ichcc.pdf. 
83. Thirty percent of all families below the poverty guidelines. U.S. DEP‘T OF 
LABOR, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC‘Y FOR POLICY, OFFICE OF PROGRAMMATIC 
POLICY, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY, 2001–
2002, at 47 (2005), available at 
www.dol.gov/asp/programs/agworker/report9/naws_rpt9.pdf. 
84. See Inter-American Development Bank, Statistics on Mexico 1996, Table 
I.1 (reflecting a mean national income of 366 pesos per month for the third quintile 
of the country population). 
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export-competitive sectors). For example, in Mexico, workers may 
leave rural farms, being unable to compete with U.S. agribusiness 
imports; they may then migrate to where new farm work can be 
found, in the U.S.85   
In this sense, globalization renders criminal ―ordinary‖ poor people 
in developing countries—not only by drawing them to labor markets 
in developed countries without documentation status but also by 
potentially increasing the lure of cash available in other criminal 
markets. (For an acclaimed fictional rendition of this perspective, see 
the recent film Maria Full of Grace about a poor Colombian girl who 
decides to leave her job in a garment factory to traffic drugs into the 
United States.) 
Thus, empirical data seem to refute a heretofore-prominent strain 
of trade theory, which sees trade and migration as substitutes: that is, 
if a labor-rich and capital-rich nation open their borders to each other, 
the labor-rich nation will export labor-intensive goods to the capital-
 
85. As commentator Philip Martin describes: 
Historically, corn in Mexico was highly protected: a guaranteed price of 
corn twice the world price has served as the social safety net in rural areas. 
Mexico had about 3 million corn farmers in the mid-1990s, but the 75,000 
corn farmers in Iowa produced twice as much corn as Mexico, at half the 
price. In this example, more US exports of corn will stimulate more 
Mexican exports of labor. [Similarly, suppose] Mexican workers are more 
productive in the United States than they are in Mexico because of better 
public and private infrastructure. Migration can then complement trade. 
This occurred when much of the Mexican shoe industry shifted from Leon, 
Mexico to Los Angeles, California in the 1980s. The somewhat surprising 
result was that shoes produced with Mexican workers in Los Angeles were 
exported to Mexico in larger volumes when NAFTA lowered barriers to 
trade. By converting less productive Mexican workers into more productive 
US workers, NAFTA discouraged the production of a labor-intensive good 
in Mexico, and encouraged migration to the United States.   
Philip Martin, Mexico-U.S. Migration, (Institute for International Economics, 
Working Paper) (on file with author). 
 In this paper, Martin includes an interesting discussion of the ramifications of 
this dynamic for traditional trade theory: 
In standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory, capital-rich Country N will 
import labor-intensive goods from labor-rich Country S. Trade 
liberalization shifts additional production of labor-intensive goods to 
Country S and capital-intensive goods to Country N. These production 
shifts in turn put upward pressure on Country-S wages, discouraging 
emigration. By contrast with the standard trade story, when technology 
differs between countries, trade and migration can be complements, not 
substitutes.   
Id. 
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rich nation. In fact, where the two nations are producing in the same 
sectors, migration and trade can serve as complements: the cheaper 
workers from the labor-rich country may migrate to the capital-rich 
country to increase productivity even further, and exports from the 
capital-rich country will displace workers in the labor-rich country. 
Philip Martin has written on how this twist occurred in the context of 
NAFTA:  
Studies on NAFTA‘s prospective impact agreed that the bulk 
of the additional jobs due to NAFTA would be created in 
Mexico. One hoped-for side effect of NAFTA was a reduction 
in unauthorized migration. This did not happen. Instead, the 
number of unauthorized Mexicans living in the United States 
rose from an estimated 2.5 million in 1995 to 4.5 million in 
2000, representing an annual increase of 400,000 a year.86 
Alternatively, illegal migrants may follow a pattern of internal-
then-external migration, pursuing new work in domestic border-area 
export processing zones from which cross-border migration—
increasingly facilitated by human-smuggling operations—is a short 
step. This internal-then-external migration often reverses but 
otherwise mirrors transnational capital flows. That is, when a U.S. 
business invests in Mexico, old labor markets are displaced and new 
labor markets are created, and simultaneously, new transnational 
networks in communication and transportation are forged, creating a 
hydraulic that draws migrant workers into the stream of transnational 
labor markets.87  
International capital flows generate yet another lever of dislocation 
in the form of currency devaluation. The 1990s featured a series of 
very prominent and very similar collapses in ―emerging‖ securities 
markets in poor countries—Mexico in the mid-1990s, East Asia in 
the late 1990s, and so on. Both market pressure and pressure from the 
international community led to concomitant currency devaluations 
which proved enormously disruptive to local economies.88 Economic 
contraction in local markets, coupled with increased desirability of 
 
86. Id.  
87. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL, A 
STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND LABOR FLOW (1990); SASKIA SASSEN, 
THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO (1991). 
88. Martin, supra note 85 (―The number of maquiladoras and their employment 
increased sharply after several peso devaluations, and reached a peak of 1.3 million 
in 2000.‖). 
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hard-currency wages, may well have reinforced the migrant stream 
and consequently would have led to some increase in the proportion 
of migrants who ―fed‖ illicit markets in one way or another—by 
hiring a smuggler so as to find work across the border or by working 
in the drug trade, the sex trade, or organized crime. 
Movement across such illicit markets occurs more easily against a 
background of lowered transaction costs generated by the deep 
transformations of economic globalization. These efficiencies in the 
global economy arise from both technological gains in transportation 
and communication and reduced tariff barriers arising out of trade 
liberalization agreements. Increased legal trade-flows across borders 
beget increased illegal trade-flows by creating opportunities to use 
otherwise legal commercial carriers for smuggling.89 In addition, 
increased volume of cross-border traffic translates into decreased 
effectiveness of border inspection.90 
Thus, globalization is powerfully at work in generating the 
material conditions and causes that drive international criminal trade. 
This does not mean, from a lawmaker‘s perspective, that 
unauthorized migration, for example, should be considered as 
equivalent to drug trafficking or the sex trade. Regulatory 
considerations relating to political and social costs and benefits will 
vary widely across these instances of cross-border illicit economies. 
The point here is not to equate all illicit transactions but rather to 
demonstrate how conditions of economic globalization contribute to 
creating the conditions for transnational illegal markets as well as the 
possibility for interlocking effects among these markets. 
B. Organized Crime and the Theory of the Firm   
With these push and pull dynamics in play, global illicit markets 
often display the same complexities of consumption and production 
patterns as their counterparts in legal trade and development.91 The 
 
89. Kal Raustiala, Law, Liberalization & International Narcotics Trafficking, 32 
N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 89, 117–18 (1999). 
90. See id. at 120–21.  
91. Chantal Thomas, Illegal Markets, Globalized Trade Flows, and International 
Legal Relations,(Sep. 22, 2006) (unpublished manuscript on file with the UCLA 
Friday Faculty Colloquium). The United States Bureau for International Narcotics 
and Law has observed that ―[t]he relatively simple charts of drug flows‖ of 
previous eras ―now resemble schematic drawings of intricate . . . networks tying 
nearly every country in the world to the . . . drug production and trafficking 
countries.‖ BUREAU FOR INT‘L NARCOTICS AND LAW, U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, INT‘L 
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black market version of the ―firm‖ is the organized crime syndicate. 
The famed economist Ronald Coase‘s ―theory of the firm‖ predicts 
that businesses will consolidate and internalize some kinds of market 
activities to reduce transaction costs and, where possible, extract 
monopoly rents.92 Consequently, some market actors will coordinate 
and consolidate channels of production, distribution, and marketing. 
Thus, as criminalization makes doing business more difficult, 
Coase‘s theory predicts that illegal firms will consolidate to 
internalize costs. Prohibition may therefore lead to larger and better-
organized crime. Relatedly, prohibition may increase the violence 
and instability associated with illicit transactions, since illegal 
contract disputes cannot be resolved using the legal system.   
Moreover, criminal prohibitions, by restricting supply, can lead to 
a significant increase in the market price of the restricted item, so that 
some suppliers who can still access the market enjoy a price-increase 
―windfall‖—a perverse consequence of a restriction that sought to 
weaken them.93 Such restrictions are also said to be relatively 
susceptible to corruption, because they encourage rent-seeking actors 
to mobilize to monopolize the restricted market.94 Thus, suppliers use 
some of the windfall to pay off law enforcement authorities, retaining 
the rest and coming out ahead in the bargain. 
In addition, because these prohibitions also impose increased costs 
associated with greater difficulty in gaining market access and the 
risk of prosecution, they may have the effect of increasing the 
monopoly power of suppliers who are able and willing to absorb the 
increased costs—hence the tendency towards large and internally 
hierarchical crime syndicates in which ―kingpins‖ are protected by 
layers of rank-and-file operators. In the case of illegal markets, this 
 
NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (1998).  
92. For an overview of Coasian theory as applied to the firm, see Stewart J. 
Schwab, Coase‟s Twin Towers: The Relation between The Nature of the Firm and 
The Problem of Social Cost, 18 J. CORP.  L. 359, 360–62 (1993). 
93. For a general explanation of the economic theory of the effect of restrictions 
on gains from trade, see RICHARD E. CAVES, JEFFREY A. FRANKEL & RONALD W. 
JONES, WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION (10th ed. 2007). 
94. Cf. Jimmye S. Hillman, Nontariff Barriers: Major Problem in Agricultural 
Trade, 60 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 491, 492–93 (1978) (describing the phenomenon in 
a more typical trade setting, that of quantitative restrictions on agricultural 
imports). For a description of this problem in Latin America, see Luz Estella Nagle, 
The Challenges of Fighting Global Organized Crime in Latin America, 26 
FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 1649, 1679–81 (2003). 
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effect means that those suppliers who can survive criminal law 
enforcement attempts actually enjoy greater market power than they 
might have in the absence of criminal prohibition. This dynamic may 
well encourage the development and consolidation of powerful 
organized crime—another perverse consequence of the prohibitions 
that sought to eliminate the crime. Given the relatively high 
transaction costs associated with illegal business, criminalization may 
have the effect of making organized crime more likely and more 
dominant.   
Under such background economic conditions, Coase‘s theory of 
the firm predicts not that the incidence of illicit market transactions 
would not diminish as a result of criminalization but rather would be 
largely unaffected but that organized crime groups would gain 
ascendance over less centralized regimes as intermediators of those 
transactions. 
The stated objectives of international criminal trade law and 
related enforcement efforts are, firstly, to reduce the incidence of 
these crimes and, secondly, to increase border security. For the 
foregoing reasons, however, these prohibitionist measures appear to 
be suboptimal. Suboptimality results not only from limited 
effectiveness but also from the regime‘s effect of exacerbating the 
very problems it seeks to solve.  
Despite these policing efforts, illicit markets continue to provide 
an important source of revenue for many developing economies.95 
Most troubling, organized crime appears to be overtaking more 
decentralized modes of supplying markets for illegal drugs and 
migrant labor.96 The shift to organized crime increases the likelihood 
 
95. See U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT: A 
GLOBAL THEMATIC EVALUATION, at 1–2, U.N. Sales No. E.05.XI.13 (2005). The 
United States government has sought to reassure the international community that 
the current approach has been successful despite some evidence to the contrary. 
Compare U.N. Says Afghan Poppy Cultivation Could Rise After Last Year‟s 
Record, INT‘L HERALD TRIB., March 6, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/artic 
les/ap/ 2007/03/06/asia/AS-GEN-Afghan-Drugs.php, with U.S. Official Claims 
Progress in Ending Opium Cultivation in Northern Afghanistan, INT‘L HERALD 
TRIB., March 9, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/03/09/euro 
pe/EU-GEN-US-Afghan-Drugs.php. 
96. Louise Shelley, Crime Victimizes Both Society and Democracy, 6 GLOBAL 
ISSUES 19, 19 (2001), available at http://www.iwar.org.uk/ecoespionage/resources/t 
ransnational-crime/gj06.htm (―The increasing visibility, assets, and political 
influence of organized criminal groups have become a matter of mounting 
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of terrorist involvement.97 
 The theory of the firm explains the syndication of illicit market 
activities but not the distinctive features of organized crime in its 
heavy use of violence and intimidation. These tactics can be 
explained, however, as ordering techniques employed in the absence 
of nonviolent means of settling disputes through the legal system or 
through other ―mainstream‖ processes. Thus, the shift to organized 
crime also increases the violence and associated dangers of illegal 
transactions. 
The circumstances of illegal migration show most starkly the 
human cost of these newer, more virulent strains of criminal trade: 
although illegal migrants have not declined in numbers,98 they are 
more likely to take more dangerous routes99 and to employ the 
services of organized criminal operators.100 Death rates have 
increased for illegal migrants as measures have been implemented to 
crack down on national borders.101  If it is true that the consequences 
of deep criminalization make the problem worse, then it is not a 
wholly rational endeavor assuming that the reduction of criminality is 
in fact the goal.   
 
international concern in recent years.‖). 
97. See Donnie Marshall, Narco-Terrorism: The New Discovery of an Old 
Connection, 35 CORNELL INT‘L L.J. 599, 601–03 (2002); Alexandra V. Orlova & 
James W. Moore, “Umbrellas” or “Building Blocks”?: Defining International 
Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime in International Law, 27 HOUS. J. 
INT‘L L. 267, 303–06 (2005) (emphasizing the evolving nature of the 
interrelationships between organized crime, terrorism, and ―legitimate society‖ and 
summarizing the difficulties this imposes on precise definitions). 
98. Bill Ong Hing, The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. 
INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 121, 131 (2001) (providing statistics to show that the increase in 
border policing under the U.S. government‘s Operation Gatekeeper has not 
decreased ―apprehension levels‖). 
99. Id. at 135. 
100. See generally Jacqueline Marie Hall, Sink or Swim: The Deadly 
Consequences of People Smuggling, 12 IND. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 365 (2002) 
(describing migrant smuggling in Europe and Australia). 
101. Daniel A. Scharf, For Humane Borders: Two Decades of Death and Illegal 
Activity in the Sonoran Desert, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L 141, 143 (2006) (―[T]he 
death toll for people illegally migrating into the United States . . . along the U.S.-
Mexico border . . . in the America‘s Southwestern Deserts has risen since the U.S. 
government launched Operation Gatekeeper in 1994.‖). 
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VI. MATERIAL ORDERING EFFECTS: THE SHADOWED TERRAIN OF 
THE MIGRANT WORKER 
The above sections have described how, in the pluralistic array of 
international legal regimes potentially governing illegal migration, 
the most prominent and influential norms arise within international 
criminal law. Given that international criminal law and its 
prohibitions will probably not significantly reduce the level of 
unauthorized migration but may increase the dangers and threats 
associated with it, the overarching result increasingly situates migrant 
labor against a relief of fear and prosecution. 
This section details some of the ways in which U.S. lawmaking, 
subsequent to the emergence of the Crime Conventions, has operated 
to strengthen and reinforce the criminality of the undocumented 
migrant worker. Such effects might be viewed as correlations or 
results of activity on the international terrain—the directionality of 
causation is less a concern here than demonstrating the argument that 
national legal events are a part of the same global social field which 
the international legal regimes described above also inhabit. 
The wave of debates over and proposals for immigration reform in 
the United States are probably the most salient among these effects. 
Despite repeated efforts by U.S. President Bush to promote a guest 
worker law that would ease entry by migrant workers, the U.S. 
legislature—which tends to be more closely tied to populist 
sentiment—repeatedly proved hostile.102 Moreover, even a guest 
worker program may only temporarily reduce rather than abate the 
problem, since its restrictions and requirements might have the effect 
of turning once-legal guest workers into illegal migrants. Populist 
sentiment has also encouraged some U.S. states to act ostentatiously 
to convey concern about illegal immigration.103 Indeed, illegal 
immigration was a campaign issue in the U.S. presidential election of 
2008 and is likely to remain contentious in the future. 
 
102. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and 
Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009) (―In the final years of the Bush 
Administration, several attempts were made to expand existing guest worker 
programs to enable the admission of greater numbers of workers, primarily through 
broadening the definition of the types of workers eligible for the temporary 
visas.‖). 
103. See, e.g., ‗State of Emergency‟ Changes the Border Political Fight, USA 
TODAY, Aug. 30, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-08-30-border-
emergency_x.htm. 
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Less widely known, perhaps, than these events in the political 
processes of the executive and legislative branch are changes in the 
law arising out of the judicial process. Yet immigration advocates see 
these changes as at least as devastating for migrant workers. In 
particular, the 2002 Supreme Court decision of Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board104 found that 
undocumented workers who are laid off because of their union 
organizing efforts have no recourse under U.S. labor law.  
In the same case, ten years before, the National Labor Relations 
Board had found that ―four union supporters had sufficient seniority 
that they would have been retained absent their discriminatory 
selection for layoff.‖105 As the case worked its way up the appeals 
process, as late as January 2001, the federal appeals court for the 
District of Columbia held that the U.S. labor relations statute did not 
bar undocumented employees from receiving back pay as a remedy 
for undocumented workers who were discriminatorily laid off due to 
their union organizing efforts.106   
The Supreme Court majority in Hoffman justified its holding 
straightforwardly, arguing that extending labor law protections to 
undocumented workers would ―trivialize‖ U.S. immigration laws.   
Yet, the dissenting opinion rejected the proposition that the 
majority could ―comfortably rest its conclusion upon the immigration 
laws‘ purposes.‖107 In doing so, the dissent alluded to the underlying 
forces of globalization: 
For one thing, the general purpose of the immigration statute‘s 
employment prohibition is to diminish the attractive force of 
employment, which like a magnet pulls illegal immigrants 
towards the United States. To permit . . . backpay could not 
significantly increase the strength of this magnetic force, for so 
speculative a future possibility could not realistically influence 
an individual‘s decision to migrate illegally. 
  To  deny . . . backpay, however, might very well increase 
 
104. 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
105. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. and Casimiro Arauz, an Individual, 306 
NLRB 17 (1992).   
106. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 639, 642 (D.C. Cir. 
2001). 
107. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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the strength of this magnetic force. That denial lowers the cost 
to the employer of an initial labor law violation (provided . . . 
that the victims are illegal aliens). It thereby increases the 
employer‘s incentive to find and hire illegal-alien 
employees.108 
Thus, the result of the Hoffman decision is that the employer was 
able to ―dismiss[] an employee for trying to organize a union—a 
crude and obvious violation of the labor laws‖ were it not for the 
majority‘s decision to withhold the protection of those laws.109 
The dissenting justices pointed to a troubling effect of the 
crackdown on illegal immigration in a context where globalization 
renders such immigration inevitable—intentionally or not, the 
crackdown has the effect of rendering workers more vulnerable to 
abuses by employers. Not only will the law refuse to help 
undocumented workers in any efforts they might make to protect 
themselves against employer abuse or to improve their workplace 
conditions; documented, legal workers will also find their own 
bargaining efforts undermined, since the employer can hire 
undocumented workers who can be abused with impunity. 
In this sense, it has occurred to me that a useful thought 
experiment is to compare the laws enforcing chattel slavery in the 
antebellum United States with those enforcing immigration laws 
today. What made slavery a product of the law was that, as long as 
someone held the status of slave and another the status of his or her 
slaveowner, the law would not only refuse to give the slave recourse 
against the slaveowner but would also aid the slaveowner in 
maintaining the slave in a position of complete vulnerability.  
Consider, for example, the Fugitive Slave Law, which required the 
return of runaway slaves.   
Slavery could work as a system of extreme subordination only 
because of a social field in which a vulnerable population was 
prevented from exercising rights against its controllers. While the 
term ―modern-day slavery‖ is used by, for example, anti-trafficking 
and anti-slavery spokespersons to describe forced prostitution or 
compulsory labor in the developing world, we should consider the 
extent to which immigration laws in developed countries, operating 
 
108. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
109. Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
THOMAS MACRO - 5-14-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2010  2:56 PM 
2010] FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL ORDER 227 
against a social field of globalization, in a context of international 
criminalization of migrants, might resemble slavery laws to an 
uncomfortable degree. 
The immediate response to this argument would be that slaves did 
not choose to enter the territories in which they were enslaved, 
whereas illegal migrants do make that choice. Thus, the 
persuasiveness of the argument depends on the degree to which one 
accepts that economic coercion is a social fact and factor in the larger 
complex of globalizing forces. Of course, even if migrant workers 
choose to enter into such circumstances because of the benefits 
available there from remittances and higher wages, social justice 
concerns still necessitate the improvement of workplace conditions. 
Following Hoffman, U.S. and Mexican labor unions filed a 
complaint with the ILO Committee alleging that the U.S. Supreme 
Court‘s decision violated the ILO treaties mentioned in Part II, above. 
The Committee observed that ―the impact of Hoffman . . . includes 
undocumented workers hired by employers in full knowledge of their 
status and who may subsequently be dismissed for exercising their 
fundamental right to organize in an effort to ensure respect for basic 
worker‘s rights.‖110 The Committee concluded that ―the remedial 
measures left [under U.S. labor law] in cases of illegal dismissals of 
undocumented workers are inadequate to ensure effective protection 
against acts of anti-union discrimination.‖111 
At the same time, the Committee declined to specify ―what precise 
remedy‖ would fulfill international law principles of 
nondiscrimination and freedom of association.112 Thus, the 
Committee ―invite[d] the Government to explore . . . possible 
solutions.‖113   
In this way, liberal, egalitarian impulses within international law 
have been recognized, but ultimately subordinated, to a concept of 
the undocumented migrant worker as a criminal.114 
 
110. ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Complaint Against the 
Government of the United States Presented by AFL-CIO, Case. No. 2524, para. 
856, in 349th Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, ILO Doc. 
GB.301/8, para. 749 (2008, Series B). 
111. Id. para. 610. 
112. Id. para. 611. 
113. Id. 
114. ―This Court has consistently set aside . . . backpay awards to employees 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The above analysis has considered the case of illegal markets, 
particularly the market for illegal migration, through the lens of legal 
pluralism. This scenario is one not just of legal pluralism but also 
legal fragmentation.115 Indeed, in his influential report on 
fragmentation for the International Law Commission, Martti 
Koskenniemi describes the problem at hand: 
―Trade law‖ develops as an instrument to regulate international 
economic relations. ―Human rights law‖ aims to protect the 
interests of individuals and ‗international criminal law‖ gives 
legal expression to the ―fight against impunity.‖ Each rule-
complex or ―regime‖ comes with its own principles, its own 
form of expertise and its own ―ethos,‖ not necessarily identical 
to the ethos of neighbouring specialization.116 
Koskenniemi addresses the juristic problems posed when legal 
regimes collide with each other not only in their specific rules but 
also in their larger goals. Thus, although the general thrust of trade 
law is to liberalize markets, and the general thrust of human rights 
law is to protect individuals, both of these regimes tend not to reach, 
formally or informally, the issues posed by illegal migration. At the 
same time, the general effect of criminalization, promoted both 
internationally and nationally, may be viewed as hostile not only to 
the liberalization of markets for migrant labor but possibly also to the 
protection of individual migrant workers. 
―Global legal pluralism . . . is not simply a result of political 
pluralism, but is instead the expression of deep contradictions 
between colliding sectors of a global society.‖117 This legal pluralism 
 
found guilty of serious illegal conduct in connection with their employment.‖  
Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137 (Syllabus). 
115.   See Fragmentation, supra note 8, para. 8 (defining fragmentation as ―the 
emergence of specialized and (relatively) autonomous rules or rule-complexes, 
legal institutions and spheres of practice‖).  
[S]uch specialized law-making and institution-building tends to take place 
with relative ignorance of legislative and institutional activities in the 
adjoining fields and of the general principles and practices of international 
law. The result is conflicts between rules or rule-systems, deviating 
institutional practices and, possibly, loss of an overall perspective on the 
law. 
Id. 
116. Id. para. 15. 
117. Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The 
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is not necessarily the juristic kind as traditionally understood; that is, 
the ―transfer of whole legal systems across cultural boundaries‖ has 
occurred in territories that were subjected to colonial rule.118 At the 
same time, the immediately preceding paragraph suggests that juristic 
pluralism may appear here, if it is defined as a situation in which the 
―sovereign commands different bodies of law for different groups of 
the population varying by ethnicity, religion, nationality, or 
geography, and when the parallel legal regimes are all on dependent 
on the state legal system.‖119   
One could argue that national regimes (enforced through 
international law in both its assertions and its omissions) prohibiting 
migration, in a context where it is inevitable given the dynamics of 
globalization, in fact maintain, in an ongoing rather than contingent 
or temporary fashion, a system in which undocumented workers are 
acknowledged and expected but, by virtue of their status, are subject 
to a different (and lesser) system of laws. In a world where territorial 
boundaries are porous but nevertheless serve as a basis for 
distinguishing identity,120 this system of managing persons according 
to documentary status seriously reinforces global socioeconomic 
hierarchy. 
 
 
Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. 
INT‘L L. 999, 1004 (2004). 
118. Barry Hooker, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND 
NEO-COLONIAL LAWS 1 (1975). 
119. Merry, supra note 1, at 871. 
120. See generally Richard T. Ford, Law‟s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 
97 MICH. L. REV. 843 (1999). 
